Tuesday marks the official unveiling of Niko Kovac as Borussia Dortmund’s new Head Coach. If everything goes according to plan, the 53-year-old will oversee the club until the summer of 2026 and will be tasked with righting the ship. The club are currently languishing in 11th place but find themselves only four points behind RB Leipzig in fourth place. Kovac has fourteen games to climb up the table but the question on everyone’s mind is; what can we expect from the new boss?

Formation

Nico Kovac’s rise to prominence came at Eintracht Frankfurt where he was tethered to the back three. The Croatian deployed three center-backs in 66% of his matches at Frankfurt with a 3-5-2 and 3-4-1-2 being the two most common lineups. Frankfurt became a team known for absorbing pressure, having less than 50% possession, and striking through quick breaks. Pace was paramount on Frankfurt’s flanks. Kovac also frequently relied on two strikers as Sebastien Haller and Luka Jovic made a name for themselves as the Bundesliga’s most lethal striker combination during Kovac’s tenure at Frankfurt. Here is what Borussia Dortmund could look like in Kovac’s 3-5-2:

At Bayern Munich, Kovac’s style of play understandably shifted. The Bavarian club’s talent advantage meant more possession and Robert Lewandowski’s undisputed status as one of the Bundesliga’s best strikers meant no tandem strike partnership. Instead, Kovac frequently deployed a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3. This might look familiar for Dortmund fans:

Kovac returned to a back three at Monaco at often deployed his trademark 3-5-2 or 3-4-1-2 with Kevin Volland and Wissam Ben Yedder leading the Monegasque attacking contingent. Despite the the similar formation, Kovac’s Monaco was a vastly different team. They were third in possession during his stint and often relied on methodical position play to pull opponents while regressing to more counter-attacking tactics when playing tougher opposition, like PSG. Here is a look at how Dortmund could line up in a 3-4-1-2 with a focus on positional play:

This article will not spend too much time talking about Kovac’s stint at Wolfsburg – his 66 games in charge of the club featured tactical inconsistencies that eventually unraveled into his firing. During his time in charge, however, saw the team feature a 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3 during his only full season in charge.

As for Borussia Dortmund, it’s difficult to predict what formation the team will deploy. The club’s lack of center-back depth may mean Kovac’s back-three system is implausible this season but could be rolled out in the future. What fans should expect is a more pragmatic approach to the starting XI. Unlike some of Dortmund’s more dogmatic coaches of the past, including Nuri Sahin, I doubt Kovac will make any promises on how he wants the team to play. His evolution through his past four clubs have shown that he is willing to challenge his own norms in an effort to put his teams in positions to win.

Without the Ball

Many pundits have described Niko Kovac as a defensive-minded manager who knows how to shore up a defense. There’s good reason for that. In his final season at Frankfurt, the Hessians had the fifth lowest xG against (xGA). His Bayern Munich team holds the record for the Bundesliga’s lowest xGA since FBref started recording the xGA in 2017. His Monaco side in 2020/21 had the second best defensive record in the league.

Kovac’s defensive stability has stemmed from a constistent philosophy on how to defend throughout all of his teams. His tutelage at Red Bull Salzburg lead to Kovac adopt a love for pressing but not to the same degree as Dortmund’s gergenpressing roots. Instead, Kovac looks to have his teams channel the opposition into wide areas through two key tenants.

The first is the initial press. When the opposition wins possession in their defensive third and begins playing the ball out from the back, Kovac instructs his attacking contingent to man-mark several of the opposing players but leave one full-back open. Here’s a crudely made example:

This press not only aims to win the ball back as the opponent is transitioning out from the back, it also looks to offset the opposition’s number advantage in their own half by isolating one side of the field from another. In theory, the ball carry will be under too much pressure to switch the ball and will be forced to play it backward, lose possession, or attempt a pass to someone under pressure.

The second key tenant is forcing the opponent into the wide areas once they transition out of their defensive third. Kovac’s sides have historically utilized a very narrow 4-4-1-1 block that concedes space out wide in favor of jamming the middle of the pitch. Once the opponent is, in theory, forced to play the ball down the wide channels – the press starts. Kovac instructs his two wide players on the ball-side of the pitch to begin applying pressure while the team’s forward closes down passing lanes or harries the outlet pass to the center-back. Again, the idea is to force the opponent to make a mistake and to keep the ball away from the top of the penalty box. Kovac’s teams attempt to win the ball as it is being recycled in possession and, if everything goes according to plan, can win the ball higher up the pitch. Here’s another fourth-grade rendering:

There is still fluidity in this system but Kovac maintains a focus on a narrow block that keeps his opponents as far away from the center of the penalty box as possible. This system does require a buy in from the players, however, as Kovac’s sides have often rack up distance covered and lowest passes per defensive action. This is where the door is opened up for things to go wrong, like they did at Wolfsburg. If you have a team that isn’t to be on the same defensive page, struggles physically to cover distance, or lacks the technical ability to win the ball – then the defensive structure falls apart.

With the Ball

Niko Kovac’s teams have a checkered history when it comes to how they play with the ball – and how effective they are going forward. Here’s a breakdown of Kovac’s goal output at each club. Only full seasons in charge are represented.

It isn’t exactly impressive reading but a look behind the curtain paints a more positive picture of Kovac’s evolution. As mentioned, pragmatism was key at Eintracht Frankfurt as Kovac inherited a side on the cusp of relegation. Frankfurt’s offense centered around quick transitions from winning the ball in advanced wide areas, as mentioned above, to longer passes behind the opposition’s to players like Ante Rebic and Luka Jovic. Kovac instructed his Frankfurt side to give as little time to the opponent as possible and play direct into the opponents hopefully disorganized defensive structure. When it worked, Frankfurt’s possession usually ended with a cut-back into the box to find Sebastian Haller or a crashing midfielder for high xG shots. The stats backed up this direct approach; Frankfurt ranked towards the bottom in the Bundesliga in touches in their defensive third (14th), carries into the final third (17th), and short passes (14th) while they were much higher on interceptions (4th), long passes (6th), shot distance (3rd shortest), and xG per shot (7th).

Kovac’s willingness to force quick transitions and play direct is something he utilized at Frankfurt, Wolfsburg, and Monaco when he found his team was at a talent disadvantage. It may also be a strategy he utilizes at Borussia Dortmund when they face off against clubs like Leverkusen, Bayern Munich, or higher-profile teams in the UCL. Karim Adeyemi, Jamie Gittens, and the full-backs could take the role of outlet passes while Serhou Guirassy acts as a poacher in the box.

What is more likely, however, is Kovac’s blended approach that he developed in Monaco. Despite inheriting a relegation threatened Monaco, the principality club was amongst the more talented teams in Ligue 1. His players were better on the ball and were not reserved to playing counter-attacking football. Kovac focused on a fluid system of positional play, a popular style of football amongst Europe’s top teams where quick and shorter passes between players attempt to stretch or pull the opposing defenders out of position to create space within the center of the pitch. Kovac’s Monaco team never reached the methodical passing of Pep Guardiola or Mikel Arteta’s Premier League sides but the Monegasques held some similar tenants. The first is that they utilized a 3-2-4-1 or 3-2-5 in possession that would look like this:

This positioning is what most of the ‘top clubs’ in Europe are utilizing when they have possession and is achieved in two ways. The first is by utilizing a back three where one center-back stays slightly deeper and the wing-backs push very high up the field to create passing triangles with the striker and other attackers (10 & 11 on the diagram above) who fall into the half-spaces between the center of the field and wide areas. The second is when a team deploys a back four where one full-back stays deep and comes central to act as the 2 or 4 position on the diagram above while the other full-back pushes up higher to provide width further up the field. The goal is the same for either set up – numerical superiority around certain areas in the final third to create space.

Monaco played out from the back where the two central midfielders, Aurelian Tchouameni and Youssouf Fofana, were tasked with staggering in the midfield and progressing the ball to the attackers in the half-spaces. If the midfielders failed to progress the ball, the wider center-backs were tasked with finding passes to Monaco’s forward line. Again, the goal was to get the ball in the half-spaces and those attackers would then attempt to pull center-backs out of position and find the open man. Once the open man was found, the goal was to get the ball in or around the top of the box. It was effective when it worked and allowed Monaco to achieve the third highest xG per shot, the third highest xG, third shortest shot distance and third highest possession.

Kovac had two contingency plans when it did not work. The first was to cycle the ball back to the wide center-back, potentially pull the opposing team away from their box, and then switch the side of play. The second contingency was to hug the touchline rather than the half-space or center and overload the opposition’s flanks in an effort to find a cut-back into the box.

When Kovac expected the opposition to press more, play a high line, or have a talent advantage, his team would adjust and be more conservative. Monaco’s full-backs would drop back and play deeper. Instead of having a forward line of four players, Monaco would utilize three players have on of the attackers drop into midfield to pull a defender and win the team a numerical advantage in their own-half. This would usually leave one of the team’s full-backs open. It looked like this:

Once the ball reached the full-back, the full-back can then drive into space or find the free man as the opponent shifted. Monaco would play quickly to try and keep the opposition disorganized if they shifted.

At Borussia Dortmund

Despite achieving a higher-goal tally at Bayern Munich, I would argue that Kovac’s stint at Monaco showcases what Kovac can bring to his team when things are working. The problem at Borussia Dortmund, however, is whether or not this positional play will work. Can Borussia Dortmund feature a back three with it’s lack of center-back depth? Can Julian Brandt, Marcel Sabitzer, or Jamie Gittens be utilized in the half-space? Do Borussia Dortmund have the talent to play positional soccer or the physicality to press in defense?

Borussia Dortmund are a work in progress and my expectation is that Niko Kovac will begin working from the defense to the offence. We should expect to see Kovac’s defensive structure and press be implemented and evolve in his first few games in charge. If the new coach believes he has the personal to implement his positional play in the coming months, we should begin to see an attacking identity throughout the rest of the season but it will take time.

The reality could be, however, that Borussia Dortmund lack the talent or physicality across the pitch to play how Monaco did. Niko Kovac was able to bring in two outfield players in the winter transfer market but will have a full offseason and summer window to create a team that plays how he wants. We may see the same pragmatic and direct style of football we saw at Frankfurt at first. The long-term standard we hold Niko Kovac to, however, should not only be the club’s position on the table but also be how he implements his attacking style of football.

Your Thoughts

Do you think Kovac will be able to implement positional play at Borussia Dortmund? Will we witness the return of pragmatic football? Can he fix Dortmund’s defense? And who will be the big winners and losers of his tenure?